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Abstract 
 
The use of sensor networks is increasing day by day; which offer more research topics to be discuss 
and modified; one of these topics is the power consumption that has to be reduced as possible, where the 
resources are limited; another topic is the security level that should be offer by such kind of networks. 
Clustered networks have been proposed in many papers to reduce the power consumption in sensor 
networks. LEACH is one of the most interested techniques that offer an efficient way to minimize the 
power consumption in sensor networks. TCCA provides LEACH with higher performance, by applying 
some modification to the way LEACH works. In this paper we combine two of the most powerful 
proposed techniques that can be applied on LEACH to reduce the power consumption and to increase the 
level of security. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Special applications with high limited and constrained resources need special kind of networks that 
can handle their needs. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) most of the time are the perfect solutions for 
these kinds of applications, where sensors are distributing around the base stations (BSs) and sensing 
reports are transmitting from these sensors to these BSs. Many researches in recent years were focused on 
this kind of networks and they mainly proposed different ways to provide this kind of networks with high 
throughputs, low delays, and less power consumption. 
 
Few papers focused on the security of WSNs even that the nature of this kind of networks may leads 
to low level of security which make these networks easy targets for intruders. Low Energy Adaptive 
Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) [1] provides an efficient communication protocol for WSNs to reduce 
power consumption and at the same time to provide some level of security. Secure LEACH (Sec-
LEACH) [2] provides high level of security to LEACH without affecting its performance; in Sec-LEACH 
the random Key Distribution (KD) technique has been applied dynamically on LEACH communication. 
Time Controlled Clustering Algorithm (TCCA) [3] presented to increase the efficiency of energy saving 
for LEACH, where they apply the time factor to control the distribution and the communication of the 
WSNs with LEACH protocol. 
 
LEACH organize the communication between nodes in WSNs in clever way, where the network is 
divided into clusters with cluster head (CH) for each cluster; the CHs mainly responsible about 
communicate the other nodes (sensors) with the BS to reduce the total energy consumption of the 
network. The CHs are to be elected based on the desired percentage of CHs and the round number; CHs 
are to be changed dynamically after each round. Sec-LEACH presents some modifications on the way 
that nodes, CHs and the BS communicate with each other, where random KD schema has to be applied 
for each transaction of the network communication to prevent many kinds of possible attacks. TCCA 
modified the way CHs have to be elected by adding another condition for electing CH; this condition is 
the availability of the energy comparing to the maximum energy of the node, which is controlled by time 
stamp. This algorithm reduced the power consumption of LEACH by good percentage. 
 
In this work, we combine both solutions provided by Sec-LEACH and TCCA in one complete 
solution, to offer a high level of security on WSN with low power consumption. In the second section we 
describe LEACH protocol and we briefly discuss some of existing works on this protocol. In the third 
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section we describe the Sec-LEACH protocol and we highlight the main improvement that offered by this 
protocol to the LEACH. In the fourth section we describe TCCA with its modifications to the original 
LEACH; in the fifth section we describe how to combine TCCA with Sec-LEACH in one protocol to 
provide one complete solution, Armor-LEACH, to WSNs that offers high level of security and high 
power of power saving. In the sixth section we analyze our solution comparing to the original protocols in 
order to maintain the complete performance of this hybrid solution. 
 
2. LEACH 
  
Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy has been presented by [1] to balance the draining of the 
energy during communication between nodes in sensor networks. The BS assumed to be directly 
reachable by all nodes by transmitting with high enough power. Nodes send their sensor reports to their 
CHs, which then combine the reports in one aggregated report and send it to the BS. To avoid the energy 
draining of limited sets of CHs, LEACH rotates CHs randomly among all sensors in the network in order 
to distribute the energy consumption among all sensors. It works in rounds; in each round, LEACH elects 
CHs using a distributed algorithm and then dynamically clusters the remaining sensors around the CHs. 
Sensor-BS communication then uses this clustering result for the rest of the round. (see Figure1) 
 
 
Figure1. Cluster organization for sensor networks 
 
2.1 LEACH Protocol 
 
Routing in LEACH works in rounds and each round divides into two phases, the Setup phase and the 
Steady State; each sensor know when each round starts using synchronized clock. 
Initially, each sensor decides if it will be a CH or not based desired percentage of the CHs for the 
network and the number of times the sensor has been a CH (to control the energy consumption), this 
decision is made by the sensor s choosing a random number between Zero and One. Then it calculates the 
threshold for s T(s), then compare the random number with result T(s); if the number is less than T(s), s 
becomes CH for the current round. T(s) for x round with desired percentage of cluster heads P is 
calculated by: 
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G is a set of nodes that have not been CHs in the last 1/p round.   
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Setup phase includes three steps. Step1 is the advertisement step, where each sensor decides its 
probability to become a CH, based on the desired percentage of CHs and its remaining energy, for the 
current round; Sensors who decides to be CHs broadcast an advertising message to other nodes that they 
are ready to become CHs. Carrier sense multiple access protocol is used to avoid the collision. Clustering 
joining step is the second step, where the remaining sensors pick a cluster to join according to the highest 
signal received; then they send request messages to desired CHs. Step three starts after CHs receive all 
requests from other sensors, where CHs broadcast confirmation messages to their cluster members; these 
messages include the time slot schedule to be used during the steady state phase.  
The Steady State phase (the actual communication) then starts and it consists of two steps; in the first 
step each nodes start to send its sensor report to its CH based on the time provided by the time slot 
schedule. When CH receives all reports, it aggregates them in one report and it sends this report to the BS 
(step 2). Next we show the details of each step by providing the content of each one, for this purpose we 
combine the two phases in one phase with five steps. 
In step one, CH broadcasts to the rest of sensors, its ID and the Advertising message, then, in step 
two, each sensor sends its ID, CH ID, and the Join Request message to its desired CH. When CH received 
all requests, it will broadcast its ID, and the time slot schedule for sensors that includes each member with 
its time slot (step three). Each sensor then sends its ID, CH ID, and the sensing report to its CH (step 
four). Finally, each CH sends its ID, BS ID, and the aggregate report of all it members to the BS. 
The transmission of information between sensors and between sensors and BSs are perform using 
CSMA MAC protocol; In other hand, all are communicate using CDMA codes to reduce the interference 
that may occur from communication of nearby nodes. 
 
2.2 Energy saving in LEACH 
 
LEACH provides many techniques to save the total energy during network communication; in this 
section we focus on the main concepts that have been applied by LEACH to save the energy. 
LEACH is self-organization, adaptive protocol and it uses randomization to evenly distribute the 
energy load among the sensors in the network; in addition to the random way that CHs rotate around the 
various sensors is reducing the possible draining of the battery for each sensor.   
Performing a local data compression to compress the amount of data being sent from clusters to BS 
reduces the energy consumption and it also enhances the system lifetime. 
The time schedule that being performed by CHs to their members, gives break time for sensors that 
are not reach their time yet to be in sleeping mode which helps them to save their energy for their 
scheduled time. 
Finally, the nature of the way that LEACH change CHs each round and the way that each CH can be 
elected provide high energy saving for the whole network. 
 
 2.3 Security in LEACH 
 
LEACH is more powerful against attacks than most other routing protocols [4]. CHs in LEACH that 
are directly communicate with BS can be anywhere in the network and they are changing from round to 
round, which make it harder for intruders to identify the critical nodes in the network. 
On other hand, LEACH vulnerable to a number of security attacks [4], including spoofing, jamming, 
and replay attacks. Since LEACH is a cluster based protocol, it relies mainly on the CHs for routing and 
data aggregation, which makes the attacks involving CHs, the most damaging attacks. 
Some kinds of attacks, such as sinkhole and selective forwarding, may occur if an intruder manages 
to become a CH, which result in disrupting the working of the network.   
  
3. Sec-LEACH 
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It proposes a new modification for LEACH to increase the level of security and to protect the network 
from many kinds of attacks, specially the sinkhole and selective forwarding attacks [2]. 
Sec-LEACH proposes to generate a large pool of keys and their IDs at the time the network is 
deployed. Each sensor then is assigned a ring of keys taken from key pool pseudo randomly [5]. First it 
generates a unique ID for each sensor using pseudo randomly function (PRF), then a large enough 
number of keys is assigned to each sensor from the key pool; also assign each node by a pair-wise key 
shared with the BS. 
 
3.1 Sec-LEACH Protocol 
 
When elected CH broadcast its advertising message, it includes the ID of the keys in its key ring, the 
other sensors cluster around the nearest CH with whom they share a key. The details of Sec-LEACH 
protocol as follows [2]. 
CHs are elected as in LEACH, and then these CHs broadcast their IDs and a nonce (step 1). In step 2, 
other sensors computes the set of CHs key IDs and choose the nearest CH with whom they share a key; 
these sensors then send the Join Request messages, protected by MAC that produced by the share key, 
and the nonce that broadcasts by CH, to prevent reply attack; the ID of the key chosen to protect the link 
is also sends with the message in order for CH to know which key to use to verify the MAC. To complete 
the setup phase, CHs send the time schedule to sensors that choose to become their members (step3). 
Step4 is the first step in Steady State phase, where sensor-to-CH communications are protected using 
the same key used to protect the Join Request message. To prevent replay, a value computed from the 
nonce and the reporting cycle is also included. CH then decrypts sensors reports and performs a data 
aggregation then it sends it to the BS protected by the symmetric key shared with the BS. A counter is 
included in the MAC value also, to provide freshness. 
 
3.2 Energy saving in Sec-LEACH 
 
Sec-LEACH works as original LEACH, but here some extra bits have to be added to the total 
transactions that occur during the communication in the network. As discussed in [2], these overloads will 
not affect the efficiency of the original LEACH if suitable size of the key pool and suitable number of 
keys assigned to each sensor are chosen. 
 
3.3 Security in Sec-LEACH 
 
 Sec-LEACH provides more protection to the network than it is in LEACH, where it protects 
against spoofing, jamming, and replay attacks. In addition, it prevents sinkhole and selective forwarding 
attacks.  
  
4. TCCA 
 
Time-Controlled Clustering Algorithm (TCCA) allows multi-hop clusters using message time-to-live 
(TTL) and timestamp to control the way the clusters form. Residual energy is also considered before 
volunteering of a sensor to become a CH, and a numerical model is provided to quantify its efficiency on 
energy usage. 
    
4.1 TCCA Protocol 
 
 Similar to LEACH, TCCA operation is divided into rounds with two phases conclude in each 
round (Setup phase and the Steady State phase). CHs are elected and the clusters are formed in Setup 
phase; then the complete cycle of data collection, aggregation and transfer to the BS is occur in the Steady 
State phase. 
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 To determine the eligibility of sensor to be CH, TCCA adds some modifications to LEACH 
technique. A sensor residual energy is considered and a random number between 0 and 1 (Tmin) is to be 
generating by each sensor to determine its eligibility to become CH. If this number is less than the 
variable threshold, the sensor becomes a CH for the current round. The threshold for sensor s in round r, 
with desired CH percentage p, residential energy RE and maximum energy MaxE is calculated by: 
        T(s) =  GsT
MaxE
RE
p
rp
p ∈∀×
−
min),
)1mod(1
(  
        T(s) =0                                                               Gs∉∀  
G is a set of nodes that have not been CHs in the last 1/p round  
 
When CH is elected, it advertises to other sensors to become its members; this advertisement message 
contains CH ID, initial TTL, timestamp and its residual energy. Sensors received the message will 
forwarded to their neighbors based on TTL value which may be based on the current energy level of CH; 
at the same time they join this CH with the rest of sensors who received the message. Once a sensor 
decides to join the cluster, it informs the corresponding CH by sending a join request message carries 
sensor ID, CH ID, the original timestamp from advertising message and the remaining TTL value.CH 
uses the timestamp to approximate the relative distance of its neighbors and to learn the best setup phase 
time for future rounds. 
The time schedule that is to be advertised by CH is based on the total number of its members and 
their relative distance to avoid the collision. 
Timestamp and TTL are used in TCCA to give the CH the ability to produce multi-hops clusters in 
efficient way that has the same performance of the one-hop clusters.  
   
4.2 Energy saving in TCCA 
 
TCCA applies new condition to electing CHs by considering the remaining energy of the sensors. At 
the same time, it guarantees that every sensor will become a CH at least one time per 1/P rounds, where P 
is the desired percentage of CHs. These modifications provide the network with high energy balance by 
distributed the energy among all sensors. 
TCCA provides optimum cluster size (K) for K-hops in order to produce high performance to the 
network that is similar to the performance in one-hop. Also it reduces the complexity of transmission 
schedule generation to O (1). 
TCCA uses timestamp and Time to live (TTL) tags to control the cluster formation; this leads to gain 
more energy balance.     
 
4.3 Security in TCCA 
 TCCA follows the main steps provided by LEACH with some modifications that do not affect the 
level of security that is provided by LEACH; this means that TCCA does not have enough protection 
against Spoofing, Jamming, Replay and some other kind of attacks. 
 
5. Armor-LEACH  
 
 The operation of Armor-LEACH combines the operations of TCCA and SecLEACH. TCCA 
provides LEACH with more energy control results in less power consumption. SecLEACH provides 
LEACH with high level of security against many kinds of attacks. 
 Armor-LEACH proposes a complete powerful solution for sensor networks communications, 
where it offers high level of security with high performance. 
 
5.1 Armor-LEACH Protocol 
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The operation of Armor-LEACH is occurs in rounds, and each round pass through five steps divided 
into two phases, Setup phase and Steady State phase. 
Prior to network deployment, each sensor assigned by group of keys randomly from big key pool 
provided by the BS. A pseudorandom function is used to produce keys IDs which then map to their 
corresponding values in the key pool. Also each sensor assigned by a pair-wise key share with the BS for 
secure direct communication. 
At the beginning of each round, CHs elect themselves. In order to determine the eligibility of sensor 
to be a CH, each sensor (S) generates a random number between 0 and 1; then this number compared by 
sensor variable threshold value T(S). if the value of threshold is greater than the random number, the 
sensor become CH for the current round (R). The threshold value can be calculated as follows: 
 
⎪⎪⎭
⎪⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧ ∈×
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otherwise
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Where P is the desired percentage of CHs, Tmin is a minimum threshold (to avoid the possibility of 
remaining energy shortage), and G is the set of sensors that have not became CHs in 1/P round. 
Setup phase is then begins with the first step (step1). Each elected CH broadcasts an advertising 
message to its neighbors announcing that it is a CH for current round; this message consists of CH ID, 
nonce, initial Time to live (TTL), remaining energy, timestamp and the advertising message. When sensor 
receives the message, it choose a key that is share with CH to use in the current round, and at the same 
time it will forward the message to its next neighbors based on TTL value which is calculated depends on 
the current remaining energy for CH. For step2 in Setup phase, each sensor, receives an advertising 
message, sends its request to the CH to join its cluster. The request message consists of sensor ID, CH ID, 
sharing key ID, join request message, original advertising message timestamp, the remaining TTL value, 
and the encryption of sensor ID, CH ID, sharing key ID, and the nonce sent by CH; the encryption is 
produced using message authentication code, which is produced using the sharing key. Timestamp helps 
CH to approximate the relative distance of its members and to learn the best Setup phase time to be used 
in future rounds. TTL with time stamp helps CH to form a multi-hops view of its clusters, in order to 
create a collision-free transmission schedule. 
In step3, CH broadcasts its ID and the time slot schedule for each sensor in its cluster to organize the 
communication between nodes in the cluster. 
The real communication begins in Steady State phase. In step1, each sensor sends its report to its CH; 
the report message consists of sensor ID, CH ID, sensor report, and the encryption of sensor ID, CH ID, 
sensor report, and the nonce with its reporting cycle within the current round; the encryption produce 
using the same MAC that is produced in step2 in Setup phase. In step2, CH sends the aggregation of 
sensors reports to the BS; this message consists of CH ID, BS ID, the aggregation of sensors reports, and 
the encryption of the aggregation report, encrypted using MAC that is produced using the sharing key 
between CH and the BS. 
Using random key distribution (RDK) to create sharing keys leads to mach most of sensors with 
available CHs. Small number of sensors may not have sharing keys; these sensors may follow another 
technique. [3] Suggests two different techniques to deal with these kinds of sensors (orphans). The first 
solution is to make these orphans communicate directly with the BS in the current round. The second 
solution is to have these orphans sleep for the current round. In both scenarios, the number of orphans in 
each round depends on the size of the key pool, the size of the group of keys of each sensor, and the 
number of CHs.           
 
5.2 Security in Armor-LEACH    
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In next section, we presents the main security issues that covered by our solution in order to know 
what improvements have been applied to LEACH; then we discuss the main factors that may affect the 
performance of security level in our solution. 
 
 
5.2.1 Security issues 
 
Armor-LEACH provides authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, and freshness to sensor-to-sensor 
communications. The message in the second step of the Setup phase, is encrypted with a key from the key 
pool; CH can conclude that the message came from legitimate sensor in the network by successfully 
decrypt the message; Also it can conclude that the message is not a stale message being replay form the 
nonce that is encrypted in the message. Nonce value is incremented every cycle which guarantee a 
freshness of all subsequence sensor reports from the sensors to their BS. By the counter value shared 
between the CH and the BS in step2 in Steady State phase, the freshness is guaranteed. 
The biggest security issue in Armor-LEACH is the resiliency against sensor captures, where the link 
keys used for sensor-to-CH communications are not pairwise in Armor-LEACH.  
 
5.2.2 Factors: Affect performance 
 
In our solution we generate a key pool that contains big enough numbers of keys to be used during 
network communications. For WSNs, the size of the key group that is to be assigned to each sensor is 
almost fixed. Once the key group size (KGS) is set, the choice of the key pool size (KPS) will affect the 
system performance in two ways: 
1. The sharing key probability between sensors: 
The probability (Pr) that two sensors, with specific KGS and KPS, will share a key is calculated 
by:  
 
)!2(!
])![(1Pr
2
KGSKPSKPS
KGSKPS
−
−−=  
When KGS is fixed, the size of KPS will affect this probability; the larger the KPS, the smaller 
the Pr [2].       2. The security level 
The probability that a link that is choosen randomly is not compromise when a sensor is not either 
end of the link is compromise is based on KPS and KGS and it determine the security level by the 
following formula: 
  Security Level= 1-
KPS
KGS
 
Given fixed KGS, KPS will determine the level security; the larger the KPS, the higher the 
security level [2]. (See Figure2) 
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Figure2. Security level affected by KGS and KPS 
6. Analysis 
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 In this section we compare our solution with LEACH, Sec-LEACH, and TCCA solutions. We 
start with energy saving, then we discuss the expected dead nodes (network performance) for each 
solution after specific number of rounds, then we reevaluate the security level that can be applied by each 
solution. 
 
6.1 Energy saving 
 
LEACH provides many techniques to save the total energy during network communication where it is 
a self-organization, adaptive protocol and it uses randomization to evenly distribute the energy load 
among the sensors in the network; in addition to the random way that CHs rotate around the various 
sensors is reducing the possible draining of the battery for each sensor. Also, performing a local data 
compression to compress the amount of data being sent from clusters to BS reduces the energy 
consumption and it also enhances the system lifetime. These factors, in addition to way that CHs 
changing every cycle, provide LEACH with High energy saving. Armor-LEACH applies the same factors 
to Sensor networks which provide it with similar energy saving to the LEACH at this point. 
TCCA adds additional factors to save energy; it uses timestamp and Time to live (TTL) tags to 
control the cluster formation, which leads to gain more energy balance; also it adds new condition to elect 
CHs each round results in more energy control. [3] Shows that TCCA works almost three times better 
than LEACH according to energy saving. Armor-LEACH applied TCCA factors, which means that it 
works three times better than LEACH according to energy saving. Sec-LEACH applied the same factors 
that have been applied by LEACH, which mean that Armor-LEACH is also works three times better than 
Sec-LEACH, according to energy saving.     
 
6.2 Performance 
 
Here, we analyze the performance based on the expected Dead Nodes that may results in each 
solution after same number of rounds.   
According to energy saving analysis, we can figure that number of Dead Nodes that may appear in 
LEACH and Sec-LEACH may reach triple value of what may appear in TCCA and Armor-LEACH, 
where number of Dead Nodes depends on the energy consumption by the network.  
 
6.3 Security 
 
Sec-LEACH provides flexible level of security that is affected by the key pool size and the group key 
size. And in the worst case, Sec-LEACH provides more security to sensor networks than what is provided 
by TCCA and LEACH. Armor-LEACH applies the techniques that are applied by Sec-LEACH, which 
provide it with same level of security that has been applied by Sec-LEACH. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Armor-LEACH provides sensor networks with high energy saving, and high level of performance, 
three times better than LEACH and Sec-LEACh. At the same time it produces higher level of security 
than it produced by LEACH and TCCA. These results produced a very efficient solution for sensor 
networks communications. 
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